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unfair to the defendant," to impose this extreme penalty upon
the escapee.61 In State v. Lampkin 2 the intended deletion of the
draconic forfeiture provision was given effect, and the Code
Comment was followed in holding that the escape of a convicted
burglar did not have the pre-Code effect of automatic forfeiture
of his appeal. Dissenting Justice Barham disagreed with the
majority of the court and with the Code Reporter as to the effect
of the deletion of former La. R.S. 15: 548. Justice Barham pointed
out that the dismissal procedure enunciated in section 548 of the
1928 Code "had been the law by judicial pronouncement" since
1884, and was merely carried forward in that Code. However, re-
gardless of the source of La. R.S. 15:548, its repeal and deletion
from the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure, along with the Re-
porter's Comment, would appear to justify the majority of the
supreme court in recognizing the legislative demise of that rule.
The situation might have been different if the rule had remained
a rule of the jurisprudence, but it had been codified in 1928 and
then repealed in 1966.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
RELEVANCY
Other Crimes
In State v. Crook,1 an aggravated rape case, the supreme
court upheld the trial court's permitting the prosecution to show
that five days before the alleged rape for which he was being
tried, defendant had raped another young woman under similar
circumstances in another section of the city. The court said that
it is admissible "for corroboration and to show the intent and
licentious disposition of defendant."2 Justice Barham wrote an
eloquent dissenting opinion, analyzing pertinent legislation and
prior statutory provisions. He forcefully contends that in the past
the Louisiana Supreme Court at times has given too broad an
interpretation to the so-called knowledge-intent-plan exception
61. LA. CODe CRIM. P. art. 919, Comment (c) further explains: "For ex-
ample, if a man has appealed from a death sentence and he escapes, under
the provisions of former R.S. 15:548 the effect is to make the escape a capital
offense, since he loses his right of appeal ......
62. 253 La. 337, 218 So.2d 289 (1969).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969).
2. Id. at 973, 221 So.2d at 477.
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to the general rule that prior criminal acts of a defendant are in-
admissible to show guilt on a particular occasion.8 With this the
writer agrees, and feels that the admission of the questioned
testimony in this case may raise serious federal constitutional
questions.4
In the instant case, the evidence was offered by the state in
its case in chief. Defendant had not put his character at issue,
and therefore it was not open to the state to attack. Under tra-
ditional notions, therefore, it seems clear to this writer that the
prior act was not admissible to show "the licentious disposition"
of the defendant. Concluding his very persuasive dissent, Justice
Barham stated:
'We have already overextended the exception to the
general rule. Some of our jurisprudence has disregarded the
explicit, unambiguous language of R.S. 15:444, 15:445, and
15:446. That language excepts evidence of other offenses
from the general rule of evidence only when 'knowledge or
intent forms an essential part of the inquiry.' I submit that
this is the law, the correct law, the rational law. The majority
holding will stretch the already overextended jurisprudential
exception."O
HEARSAY
A vigorous application of the intricacies of the hearsay rule
is at times awkward indeed. Confronted by a very difficult prac-
tical problem (proof of the amount of a wholesale grocery sales-
man's defalcation in a complicated far-flung operation with a
number of customers), the Court of Appeal for the Second Cir-
cuit, in Salley Grocer Co. v. Hartford Accident & Idem. Co.," on
original hearing found the proffered testimony to be inadmissible
hearsay. The evidence in question was (1) the testimony of
plaintiff's assistant manager who had made an investigation and
survey of the numerous outstanding customer accounts and the
vendor's records with respect to same, and (2) a recapitulation
prepared by him showing the shortages in the various accounts.
3. See LA. R.S. 15:445, 446 (1950).
4. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969), where the United States
Supreme Court dismissed a writ of certiorari in a case raising a similar
problem on the grounds that the federal constitutional question which was
the basis for the granting of the writ had not been raised or passed upon
by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
5. State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 981, 221 So.2d 473, 480 (1969).
6. 223 So.2d 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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On rehearing, the court reversed itself, taking a very relaxed
view of the hearsay rule. Finding the proffered evidence to be
reliable and the circumstances necessitous, the court held it ad-
missible in this case to establish a prima facie case as to the
amount of the loss. Significantly, the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied writs. The case appears to have real importance; for, un-
able to fit the evidence into an appropriate pigeonhole exception
to the hearsay rule, but finding that it was nonetheless "reliable,"
and that the necessity therefor was evident, the court was willing
to admit it.7 Of course, there is much less danger in admitting
hearsay when, as in the instant case, it is a civil case tried to a
judge alone.
An interesting case to be considered in connection with the
Salley Grocer Co. case is Murray v. Murray,8 a custody case. Re-
lying on prior jurisprudence, the court held that a report pre-
pared by the State Department of Public Welfare containing the
results of their investigation and their recommendations was
inadmissible. In giving its reasons for the holding, the court
stated that "much therein was predicated on hearsay and the
parties furnishing the information were not available for cross-
examination."' It would seem to this writer that whether or not
the persons furnishing the information to the investigator had
been available for cross-examination, the report itself was none-
theless hearsay and technically inadmissible. It appears that re-
ports prepared by professional people from the Department of
Public Welfare are often regarded as very helpful in custody
cases and it may well be that a hearsay exception should be es-
tablished to permit the reception of such reports with appropriate
safeguards. Language from a prior case, LeBlanc v. LeBlanc,0
quoted in the Murray case with apparent approval, indicated that
such reports should be admissible if the opponent is first given
an opportunity to see the report, to confront the investigator
preparing it, and cross-examine him. The implication from the
language of LeBlanc seems to be that it would not have been
necessary to call the person giving the information to the inves-
7. In so holding, the court relied on the discussion in 29 Am. JUR. 2d
Evidence §§ 496, 458 (1967). See also in this connection Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). The approach
taken seems consonant with that suggested in PREIMINARY DRAF OF PRO-
POSED RULES OF EvENcE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAaIS-
TRATES R. 8-02.--8-04. (March 1969).
8. 220 So.2d 790 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 223 So.2d 411 (La.
1969).
9. Murray v. Murray, 220 So.2d 790, 793 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
10. 194 So.2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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tigator. The safeguards suggested by Murray may be too onerous
for they may make it very difficult to get the kind of information
needed for a reliable report. The questions are (1) whether a
hearsay exception should be established for such reports in cus-
tody cases and (2) if so, what should be the requirements for the
exception. 1
Res Gestae-Excited Utterances
Determining whether or not an out-of-court statement offered
in court is hearsay depends upon the relevancy of the statement.
Is it the truth of the statement that is pertinent or the mere fact
that it was said? If it is the mere fact that it was said-as in a
slander case or an offer to purchase-then a non-hearsay use of
the statement is involved. 12
In State v. Hudson,'5 the court was confronted with the ad-
missibility of a statement made to a police officer by the victim
of a shooting (who died the next day), given immediately after
the shooting while the declarant-victim held one of the culprits
at bay at gunpoint. Although La. R.S. 15:447 states that state-
ments of the participants "narrating the events" are not part of
the res gestae,' 4 the court, relying especially on La. R.S. 15:44815
held that the statement was admissible under the res gestae ex-
ception to prove the truth of its contents. Rather than using the
res gestae exception, it seems to this writer that it would have
been preferable to find the statement admissible under the ex-
cited utterance exception. 6 The court went on to find that the
declaration in question was also admissible to show the fact that
11. The Murray case is to be contrasted with In re State in Interest of
Elliott, 206 So.2d 802 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968), dealing with the admissibility of
"otherwise inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence" under LA. R.S.
13:1579.1 (1950) in neglect and delinquency cases. See also the discussion
In The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-
Evidence, 29 LA. L. REv. 310, 319 (1969).
12. See Comment, 14 LA. L. REv. 611 (1954).
13. 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969).
14. LA. R.S. 15:447 (1950) in its entirety provides: "Res gestae are events
speaking for themselves under the immediate pressure of the occurrence,
through the instructive, impulsive and spontaneous words and acts of the
participants, and not the words of the participants when narrating the
events. What forms any part of the res gestae is always admissible in
evidence."
15. LA. R.S. 15:448 (1950): "To constitute res gestae the circumstances
and declarations must be necessary incidents of the criminal act, or im-
mediate concomitants of it, or form in conjunction with it one continuous
transaction."
16. See the excellent recent Comment, Excited Utterances and Present
Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29
LA. L. REv. 661 (1969).
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it was made. With deference, it is submitted that under the cir-
cumstances of the case it was the truth of the out-of-court state-
ment that was relevant rather than the mere fact that it was said.
Business Records
The need for a properly drawn business record exception to
the hearsay rule is quite clear, and there have been extensive
developments in this area elsewhere in the country.17 Article
2248 of the Louisiana Civil Code constitutes an inappropriate and
anachronistic provision:
"The books of merchants can not be given in evidence in
their favor; they are good evidence against them, but if used
as evidence, the whole must be taken together."
To avoid hardship, Louisiana courts have developed rather vague
exceptions 18 to the "rule" of article 2248, and it is fair to state
that the article is not always given full effect. Talley v. Duplan-
tis,19 decided during the past term, reflects the continued will-
ingness of the courts to strain hard to avoid the harsh and im-
practical results of the archaic rule. It seems clear, however, that
a repeal of article 2248 and appropriate legislation is much needed.
Admissions-Statement by Minor in
Tort Action Against Parent
In a suit against a parent for damages occasioned by the torts
of his minor child, are out-of-court statements by the child ad-
mitting the alleged act admissible against the parent as "admis-
sions"? In McCrossen v. Stoyka,20 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal, relying on prior Louisiana Supreme Court decisions,
answered in the negative. The Louisiana cases relied on cer-
tainly support the position taken in McCrossen v. Stoyka, but it
is submitted that such out-of-court statements are generally re-
liable and their admissibility desirable.21 The proposed Uniform
Rules of Evidence, in a salutary provision, would appear to make
17. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES R. 8-03.(b) (6), (7) and comments
185-190 (1969) and authorities cited therein; Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 449
(1961); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Ter'm-
Evidence, 19 LA. L. REV. 431 (1959).
18. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 449 (1961).
19. 213 So.2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
20. 218 So.2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
21. If such statements do not qualify as admissions, they may, under
appropriate circumstances, be admissible as declarations against interest.
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such statements admissible as vicarious admissions, 22 and the
Model Code of Evidence 23 likewise seems to favor admissibility
in such cases. It is to be hoped that the supreme court would re-
consider the problem.
Admissions-Binding Effect of Pleadings
A party litigant is not inexorably bound by testimony given
by him as a witness on the stand.24 Also, a party is not inexorably
bound by factual allegations contained in pleadings in a different
proceeding.25
There is language in Merriell v. Collins,26 a court of appeal
case, indicating that a party litigant is not even bound by factual
allegations in an unamended pleading in the instant proceeding,
provided plaintiff testifies that he did not make such representa-
tions to his attorney and that his attorney, only, signed the peti-
tion. This position appears contrary to the provisions of Civil
Code article 2291, as elucidated in Sanderson v. Frost27 and Jack-
son v. Gulf Ins. Co.28 It is submitted that until a pleading is
amended, the factual allegations contained in the pleading should
bind the party litigant. Otherwise, his opponent might be sur-
prised and unduly prejudiced. If a litigant successfully contends
that a factual allegation contained in his pleading is erroneous
or made through error or without authority, then it appears that
the remedy is to be found in the new Code of Civil Procedure's
very liberal rules relative to amendment of pleadings.2
22. UNIiORm RULES OF EvDwmNcE rule 63(9)(C) (1964) provides:
"RULE 63, Hearsay Evidence Excluded-Exceptions. Evidence of a state-
ment which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and in-
admissible except:
"(9) Vicarious Admissions. As against a party, a statement which would
be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing if ... (c) one of the
issues between the party and the proponent of the evidence of the statement
is a legal liability of the declarant, and the statement tends to establish that
liability."
23. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508(c) (1942). See also C. McCoRMICK,
EviDENcm § 244 (1954).
24. Jackson v. Gulf Ins. Co., 250 La. 819, 199 So.2d 886 (1967); see discus-
sion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-
Evidence, 28 LA. L. Rsv. 429, 438 (1968); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1961-1962 Term-Evidence, 23 LA. L. REV. 406 (1963).
25. Sanderson v. Frost, 198 La. 295, 3 So.2d 626 (1941).
26. 218 So.2d 632 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
27. 198 La. 295, 3 So.2d 626 (1941).
28. 250 La. 819, 199 So.2d 886 (1967).
29. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1151-1156.
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WITNESSES
Impeachment
In 1967, in State v. Barbar,80 the supreme court held that if
the state offers evidence of a prior statement of its own witness
for purposes of impeaching the witness, and the out-of-court
statement is pertinent to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
it is the duty of the court on its own motion, and contemporane-
ously, to instruct the jury of the limited use to which the state-
ment may properly be put-that is, to negative the testimony
given by the witness on the stand, not for substantive proof of
the guilt of the defendant. 81 As apparently recognized in Barbar,
the same reasoning applies whether the witness to be impeached
is defendant's witness or the state's own witness. Relying on
Barbar, in a decision by Justice Hamiter, the court very properly
applied the same rationale to an analogous situation.8
Scope of Redirect Examination
La. R.S. 15:280 provides that a witness who has testified to
any fact in chief may be cross-examined on the entire case-thus
adopting the so-called "broad rule" of cross-examination. The
next section (La. R.S. 15:281) stipulates that redirect is to be
limited to the subject matter covered on cross-examination. The
section goes on to state, however, that the application of the rule
is within the discretion of the trial court, provided that if the
rule is relaxed, opportunity must be given the cross-examiner to
recross on any matter brought out on redirect.
Where there has been redirect examination of a witness, is
it contemplated that recross is to be limited to the matter covered
on redirect? The above-noted statute did not cover the point,
but the implication seems clear--otherwise, the symmetry would
be destroyed. The suggested pattern comports with that followed
elsewhere in the country. 8
It seems to this writer that the legislature intended that the
same rules would govern on recross-examination of a defendant
who takes the stand. In State v. Giles, 4 however, the supreme
30. 250 La. 509, 197 So.2d 69 (1967).
31. See discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1966-1967 Term-Etdence, 28 LA. L. REv. 429, 430 (1968).
32. State v. Whitfield, 253 La. 679, 219 So.2d 493 (1969).
33. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCR § 32 (1954); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDHRAL PRACTCIC
AND PROCRDURE § 416 (1969).
34. 253 La. 533, 218 So.2d 585 (1969).
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court held the contrary, relying on La. R.S. 15:462, which provides
that when a defendant (or his spouse) becomes a witness, he is
subject to all the rules applying to other witnesses, and "may be
cross-examined upon the whole case." With deference, it is sub-
mitted that the fact that the statute provides that a defendant who
takes the stand may be cross-examined on the whole case should
not be interpreted to mean that the state is entitled to recross-
examine as to the entire case. It is the opinion of the writer, how-
ever, that rules relative to the scope of examination and cross-
examination should be general guidelines only and that the trial
judge in his discretion should be able to depart therefrom in ap-
propriate cases.
It is interesting, perhaps, to note that since the federal courts
follow the "narrow rule" of cross-examination and in that court
the waiver of privilege against self-incrimination is effective
only to the extent of the matter covered on direct and issues
going to defendant's credibility, 85 an argument can be made that
because of Malloy v. Hogan8 and its application of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, the states may now be
obliged to apply the "narrow rule" of cross-examination when
a defendant takes the stand.87 It is hoped, however, that any such
.argument would be rejected, for the "broad rule" seems much
the sounder approach.
DIscOvERY
Louisiana was the first state in the country to hold that a
defendant has the right to a pre-trial inspection of his written
confession.8 8 For reasons that seem to this writer subject to
criticism,89 the Louisiana Supreme Court has refused to expand
this right of pre-trial inspection. Just this past term, the court
upheld the trial court's refusal to permit defendant a pre-trial
35. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 407 (1969).
36. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
37. In this connection see Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1925).
38. See State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945); See also discus-
sion In The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-
Evidence, 26 LA. L. REv. 606, 613 (1966); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Evidence, 18 LA. L. REv. 139, 143 (1958).
39. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965
Term--Evdence, 26 LA. L. REv. 606, 613 (1966); The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Evidence, 18 LA. L. Rzv. 139, 143
(1958).
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inspection and analysis of gleanings from his clothing alleged to
contain marijuana, stating the same was privileged.40
Is video tape of a defendant's confession a "written" confes-
sion within the meaning of State v. Dorsey?41 In State v. Hall,4
the court, in a well-reasoned opinion, held in the affirmative, indi-
cating that it would hold likewise as to a wire or tape recording.
CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, AND EvIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTs
Confessions-Voluntariness and Waiver
It is quite clear that a person in police custody has a federal
constitutional right not to answer questions put to him by the
police. Under Miranda v. Arizona,48 he is to be advised, inter
alia, of this right. Although he can waive it, presumably the
waiver would be ineffectual unless it were knowingly and intel-
ligently made.44 It would seem that such a waiver is very similar
to the traditional "voluntariness" requirement for the admissi-
bility of a confession. What if a person in police custody, prior
thereto, on his own and without official inducement, had become
drugged or intoxicated, and such condition clearly "loosened his
tongue"?45 The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Manuel"
(a murder case) took what seems to this writer to be too broad a
position in favor of admissibility, stating
"To render a confession inadmissible, drug or alcohol
intoxication must be of such a degree as to negate the de-
fendant's comprehension and render him unconscious of
what he is saying. If a defendant understands the statements
directed to him and knows what he is saying, the confession
is admissible.147
40. State v. Clack, 254 La. 61, 222 So.2d 857 (1969). See also State v. Crook,
253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969). For discussion as to the privilege question,
see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-
Evidence, 26 LA. L. REv. 606, 613 (1966).
41. 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273 (1945).
42. 253 La. 425, 218 So.2d 320 (1969).
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see Comment, 26 LA. L. Rzv.
705 (1966).
45. For discussion of the problem, see In re Cameron, 68 Cal. 2d 487, 439
P. 2633, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1968); State v. Warner, 237 A.2d 150 (Me. 1967);
B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs ON EVIDENCE IN CRMINAL CASES 299
(1969).
46. 253 La. 195, 217 So.2d 369 (1969).
47. Id. at 203, 217 So.2d at 371.
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A federal constitutional question is, of course, at issue and ulti-
mately the impact of antecedent "voluntary" intoxication on an
in-custody confession is for the United States Supreme Court to
determine.
Confessions of Co-Defendants-Limiting Instructions
As recognized in State v. Hopper,48 where two defendants
are tried jointly and each has issued a confession implicating not
only himself but his co-defendant as well, limiting instructions
by the court that the confession of each is to be used against that
confessor only are inadequate to protect federal constitutional
confrontation rights. Under the circumstances of Hopper, how-
ever, the majority held that the error involved was "harmless
error." 49
Confessions-Burden of Proof
In State v. Skiffer,50 the supreme court held that the burden
of proof is upon the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the legal requirements for voluntariness of admissions and
confessions have been complied with.51 The court included within
this rule proof that the demands of Miranda52 have been met.
Defendant had been arrested, given what the court found to be
an incomplete Miranda caution, and some time thereafter made
to police officers the admission in question. The court held that
the state had failed to prove that it was not made during a period
of "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda.58
Apparently, the court would not in this context draw any distinc-
tion between the requirements for admissibility of inculpatory
or exculpatory admissions made to police, or admissions involving
criminal intent or inculpatory fact-a distinction drawn in a dif-
ferent setting in State v. Andrus.5 4
48. 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969).
49. For a discussion of harmless error in this context, see text accompa-
nying note 74 infra and the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
50. 253 La. 405, 218 So.2d 313 (1969).
51. Cf. the discussion on the burden of proof issue in State v. Collins,
253 La. 149, 217 So.2d 182 (1968).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. For another case during the past term holding that the state had
failed to sustain its burden of proof as to the voluntariness of the inculpa-
tory statement, see State v. Collins, 253 La. 149, 217 So.2d 182 (1968).
54. 250 La. 765, 199 So.2d 867 (1967); see discussion in The Work o the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-Evidence, 29 LA. L. av.
310, 322 (1969).
[Vol. 30
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Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-
Refusal to Take Blood Test
Schmerber v. California"5 held that the privilege against self-
incrimination did not preclude the admissibility of blood taken
from the veins of a suspect by the police over his protest. In so
holding, the Court found that the privilege extended to "evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature""0 not to "compul-
sion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or
physical evidence.' "57
In a negligent homicide case, is the refusal of a defendant
to submit to a blood test admissible on behalf of the state? This
was the problem faced in State v. Dugas,5 and answered in the
affirmative. Quoting and relying upon the above language from
Schmerber, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "since such
bodily evidence violates no privilege against self-incrimination,
neither does testimony of a refusal to give bodily evidence violate
that privilege."' With deference, the writer disagrees. Admissi-
bility seems to be based on the notion that the statement of refusal
is an admission-that the fact that the suspect refused tends to
show that he believed himself to be guilty, or at least that he
feared that the test would so indicate. It is relevant, for the inci-
dence of intoxicated people is probably higher among those who
refuse to submit to the test than among those submitting. His
refusal is not "real or physical evidence"; it is an assertion that
he did not want to submit to a blood test, and this assertion (or
testimonial utterance) is used as the basis for inferences as to
what he thought. From what the suspect thought, thus inferred,
one infers a physical fact. Admittedly, the line is a thin one, but
the writer believes the United States Supreme Court in Schmer-
ber went about as far as it intends to go in the direction of ad-
missibility."" Although, under appropriate circumstances, the
state can forcibly extract blood from a suspect, it should not be
able to use his mental attitude-his disinclination to submit to
the test-as a basis for an inference tending to show he was in-
toxicated. A subsequently enacted statute0 ' provides for the ad-
missibility of refusal to submit to a blood test and it will be in-
55. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56. Id. at 761.
57. Id. at 764.
5& 252 La. 345, 211 So.2d 285 (1968).
59. Id. at 355, 211 So.2d at 289.
60. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966).
61. IA. R.S. 32:666 (Supp. 1968).
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teresting to see what the United States Supreme Court does with
the problem in future cases. It denied writs in the Dugas case.
Search and Seizure
In a dissenting opinion in State v. Lampkin,a Justice Barham
made a very strong argument that the court erred in rejecting
defendant's contention that the evidence complained of had been
obtained pursuant to an illegal search warrant. He argued most
persuasively that the affidavit in question did not contain suffi-
cient facts and information to show probable cause for the issu-
ance of the warrant, and that the affidavit and the warrant
failed "to clearly and particularly designate the premises to be
searched.",
Subsequently, in State v. Wells,"4 in a persuasive opinion by
Justice Hamiter, the court reversed the conviction therein, hold-
ing that the evidence in question had been obtained as a result
of an illegal search and seizure. The search warrant used to jus-
tify the search was held invalid because the underlying affidavit
failed to recite sufficient facts to uphold the issuance of the war-
rant. Justice Barham concurred, noting that he did so for the
additional reasons set forth in State v. Lampkin, and contending
that the search warrant in Lampkin was almost identical to the
one in Wells. It seems to this writer that the position taken by
Justice Hamiter and the majority in Wells, and by Justice Barham
in his dissenting opinion in Lampkin and his concurring opinion
in Wells represents the proper view.
What is the proper scope of a search incident to a lawful
arrest? In State v. Vale, 5 police had had a house under surveil-
lance and had a warrant for the arrest of defendant, an occupant
of the house. Police officers watched defendant come out of the
house, go to an automobile parked in front of it, return to the
house, and thereafter deliver to the person in the car something
believed by the police officers to be narcotics. Police advanced
upon the defendant; he started walking quickly towards the
house, and as he reached the front steps thereof, the officers told
him he was under arrest. After giving the defendant a caution
as to his constitutional rights, they told him they were going to
search the house, which they proceeded to do. The Louisiana
62. 253 La. 337, 218 So.2d 289 (1969).
63. Id. at 359, 218 So.2d at 297.
64. 253 La. 925, 221 So.2d 50 (1969).
65. 252 La. 1056, 215 So.2d 811 (1968).
[Vol. 30
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Supreme Court upheld the trial court's admission of narcotics
found in the house pursuant to such search, holding that the
search of the house was incidental to a lawful arrest. With defer-
ence, the writer doubts whether such a search would have been
upheld even under the broad view taken by the Harris" and
Rabinowitz" cases. In Chimel v. California,8 a case decided sub-
sequent to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Vale, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Harris-
Rabinowitz approach to the problem, in effect overruling these
cases. The Chimel holding would seem to make it clear that a
search such as that in Vale would not be authorized as incidental
to a lawful arrest. In Chimel, the Court stated:
"Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to
the facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here
went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against
him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence
of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that
area. The scope of search was, therefore, 'unreasonable'
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the pe-
titioner's conviction cannot stand."' 9
Right to Counsel-Identification
State v. Singleton7 0 involves several interesting points rela-
tive to in-court eye witness identification of the defendants as
the perpetrators of the crimes. Shortly after the report of the
alleged crimes (rape and attempted rape), defendants had been
picked up and taken to the sheriff's office. The two girls involved
and their escorts were also taken to the sheriff's office, where they
viewed the handcuffed suspects and identified them as the cul-
prits. Although there had been no "line-up," the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, relying on United States v. Wade,71 held that the
66. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
67. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
68. 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969).
69. Id. at - , 89 S.Ct. at 2043.
70. 253 La. 18, 215 So.2d 838 (1968).
71. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The court did not discuss the questionable efficacy
of the congressional attempt to repeal the rule of United States v. Wade
insofar as it deals with the admissibility of eye witness testimony in federal
courts (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act § 701(a), 18 U.S.C.§ 3502 (1968)), nor the possible impact of such legislation on the admissibili-
ty of eye witness testimony in state courts.
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fact that defendants were unrepresented by counsel at the iden-
tification procedure and had not effectively waived their right to
same, constituted a violation of their right to counsel at a critical
stage of the proceedings. The court found, however, that the
prosecution had "established by convincing proof" that the in-
court identification was "based on observations of the accused
independent of and disassociated" from the "tainted" pre-trial
identification.7 2 It was concluded, therefore, that the in-court
identification did not violate the rule of Wade.
The court next considered whether the fact that the out-of-
court identification was made while the suspects were handcuffed,
without the protection afforded by a line-up, was itself a viola-
tion of due process of law. The Louisiana Supreme Court appar-
ently recognized, as has the United States Supreme Court,78 the
obvious dangers in not employing the line-up identification pro-
cess, but held that under the circumstances of the instant case
the procedure employed (aside from the right to counsel issue
discussed above) did not involve a violation of constitutional
rights.
Harmless Error-Confrontation
State v. Hopper74 was a case involving the admissibility of
the confessions of two defendants, each confession implicating
both defendants.7 5 Initially decided by the Louisiana Supreme
Court"0 before the United States Supreme Court decision in
Bruton v. United States,7 the case was remanded to the Louisiana
Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Bruton and
Roberts v. Russell. 8 On remand, a divided court again affirmed
the convictions, finding that although defendants' federal consti-
tutional confrontation rights had been violated, under the cir-
cumstances of this case the violations were "harmless error."
In so deciding, the majority applied the test outlined in Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 921, whereas Chief Justice
72. State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 30, 215 So.2d 838, 842 (1968).
73. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
74. 253 La. 439, 218 So.2d 551 (1969) (United States Supreme Court appeal
pending).
75. For further discussion of the Hopper case, see text accompanying
note 48 supra.
76. State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 203 So.2d 222 (1967); see discussion in
The Work of the Louistna Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-
Evtdence, 29 LA. L. Rzv. 310, 326 (1969).
77. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
78. 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
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Fournet and Justice Barham argued in strong dissenting opinions
that the federal rule embodied in Chapman v. Californiaf9 con-
trolled and dictated a contrary result. It seems to this writer
that where federal constitutional rights are involved, the federal
test as to harmless error controls.8 0
In another case involving the confrontation problem,"' the
supreme court very properly held that under the circumstances
presented, the admission at the trial of testimony given by a
witness at the preliminary hearing violated defendant's Louisiana
constitutional rights to confrontation. The court, without discus-
sion, found that the violation constituted prejudicial, reversible
error, and the writer agrees. It appears that the same result would
have been reached under federal confrontation guarantees.8a
79. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
80. For further development of the federal test in the Bruton area, see
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). It is to be noted that an appeal
to the United States Supreme Court in the Hopper case is pending.
81. State v. Augustine, 252 La. 983, 215 So.2d 634 (1968).
82. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
